



Evolving Commercial Rotorcraft Cockpits

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Experimental Test Pilot

AgustaWestland

Discussion

- Historical Look at Rotorcraft Safety
- Rotorcraft Technology Changes
Last 10 years
- Vision of the Future Commercial
Rotorcraft Cockpit
- The Challenge for Rotorcraft Testers





























But this presentation is about **SAFETY!**




Helicopter Crash Statistics



Helicopter Crash Statistics




Causal Factors



Statistics taken from the International Helicopter Safety Team, Year 2000 Report, Published Sep 2007


Phase of Flight

Year 2000



Flight Hours of Mishap PIC


Year 2000



Statistics taken from the International Helicopter Safety Team, Year 2000 Report, Published Sep 2007

Crash Causal Factors

Year 2000



Statistics taken from the International Helicopter Safety Team, Year 2000 Report, Published Sep 2007



2001 to 2005 Accidents/100,000 flight hours

9.1

But this photo is 2013!



IHST 2000 Report: 15 Helicopter Missions Analysed

Technology Based Recommendations

Recommendation	Examples of Technology Solution Suggested	#of Missions With This
Improve Investigation	Cockpit Recorder Voice/Data/Video	15 / 15
Prevent Parts and Systems Failures	Health Monitoring HOMP / HUMS	14 / 15
Increase Pilot Situational Awareness External Environment	RADALT, SVS, Dig Map, EVS, NVG, GPWS, AWOS, Radar, Multi Axis Video, Obstacle Detection, <u>Stabilization, Coupled modes</u>	10 / 15
Improve Crash Survivability	Crash Resistant Systems Crash worthy fuel systems, structure, seats	10 / 15
Increase Pilot Situational Awareness of Aircraft State	Caution, Warning on systems, Low Rotor, Roll Over, Low speed, Low Fuel, High ROD, Door Position	7 / 15
Prevent Catastrophic Strike	Wire strike and T/R strike protection	7 / 15
Improve Judgement with better Weather Reporting	Ground Systems	11 / 15
Avoid Inadvertent IMC	IIMC Avoidance Training and IIMC Emergency Training	9/15

CHANGE IS HAPPENING

- Authorities: Regulation
 - JAROPS 2004 (Now EASA CAT)
 - Environment Based Requirements
 - FAA 2012
 - Emergency Medical Services Requirements
- Manufactures: Technology Push (\$Investment\$)
- Operators: Change Market Paradigms
(\$Operator buy-in to Value\$)

AW139

First Certified in Europe 2003
Modified Honeywell Epic Flight Deck



**Best Selling
Medium Class
Helicopter
in World**



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


Manufacturers: Technology Push



Operators: Change Market Paradigms

**Best Selling
Medium Class
Helicopter
in World**





REGULATION


COMPETITION

DEMAND

VALUE!

Technology Race!

SAFETY!
2003-2013




RELIABILITY!
SAFETY!
CAPABILITY!
PERFORMANCE!
COST!

SVS
DIG MAP
IFR
AIRCRAFT STATE
ATTD MODES
TCASII
EVS
CPLD MODES
LPV
OEI
CPLD VFR APPR
TAWS
HUMS
OBSTACLE DETECTION
AWOS
NVG
RADAR
FLIR
Video

Workload
SA
HMI

The Race Continues

Future Rotorcraft Technology



The Market Yesterday



IFR, SVS,
EVS, TAWS,
DIG MAP,
TCAS, ADSB
CPLD VMC
APPR,
VIDEO, FLIR,
LPV 9 Deg,
Increased
Aircraft State
Indications,
human error
prevention



The Market Today




- Integrated and Automated.
- No ECLs or Manual modes
- Centralized Systems Interface
- Cursor Interface
- Hands on Controls Interface
- Automated Systems Pages



The Market Tomorrow



- Touch Screens
- Icon driven menus
- Advanced AC State graphics



Future Rotorcraft



- Touch Screen MFD and PFD
- Automated Flaps
- Automated RPM Control
- Automated Nacelle
- Dark Cockpit
- Tactile Cueing



Future Rotorcraft



Our Hope for the future

- Human Friendly Flight Cues
- Intuitive SA of External World
- Very Low Work Load Cockpit
- Human Error Tolerant
- Human Error Prevention
- Easy Emergency Procedures

So What Does This Mean for Testers?

- Testing is always challenging
- Testing new technology even more challenging
- But What is New or Changing?
 - Fly By Wire? Not new.
 - Software? Well standardized.
 - Structure, Systems, Propulsion? Nothing new.
 - Flight Displays? Yes, they continue to evolve.
 - Highly integrated complex systems co-managed by computer and human? YES! This worries me!

Highly Integrated Complex Systems Co-Managed by Computer and Human

- How Do We Test This?
 - What are the test tools?
 - What is the standard?
 - How do we cover all the possible interactions?
 - Can we avoid/reduce human startle factor?
 - Can we stop humans from creative interactions?
 - What are the lessons already learned?
- I am here to learn!
- I do have some opinions to offer.

Two Personal Examples

- Lose of Engine Control
 - Sticky fuel metering spool
 - Computer monitoring design error
 - Computer error, human did not understand
- Lose of Control In Flight
 - Air data failure
 - Unexpected Pilot Intervention
 - Human error ,computer did not understand
- Both in a Controlled Test Environment
- Good Test Data
- Not Part of a Planned Test Point



Some Testing Suggestions

- Design Concepts
 - Computer Responsibility vs. Human Responsibility
 - HMI or CRM?
- Early Involvement in Design
 - HMI Meetings with all contributors
 - Testers, Controls, Avionics, Contractors.....
 - My Example; Weekly Meetings, Focused Discussion
- Laboratory, Ground and/or Air
 - The more realistic the better
 - Extensive play time in laboratory
 - My Example; Vehicle Man Systems Interface Lab

What About Flight Test?

- Full up Testing of Computer-Human interactions?
- Computer response to failure modes and human reaction?
- Hard To Do in a comprehensive manner!

Questions!



2006 Report


- World Accident rate 6.5
- US Accident Rate 5.6

<i>SPS Group (Level 1)</i>	<i>Count of Usage</i>	<i>Count of Accidents</i>	<i>% of Accidents</i>
Pilot Judgment & Actions	299	140	92.1%
<i>Data issues</i>	<i>176</i>	<i>122</i>	<i>80.3%</i>
Safety Management	81	56	36.8%
Pilot Situation Awareness	67	50	32.9%
Ground Duties	58	50	32.9%
System Component Failure	51	46	30.3%
Mission Risk	32	28	18.4%
Maintenance	44	25	16.4%
Post-crash survival	27	20	13.2%
Regulatory	14	12	7.9%
Communications	11	11	7.2%
Safety Systems and Equipment	9	9	5.9%
Infrastructure	7	7	4.6%
Personnel - Non Crew	4	4	2.6%

Table 8. Level 1 Standard Problem Statements by Accident

2006 Report

Number of Accidents by Primary Operation



2006 report




Figure 3. Accidents and Fleet Weight Group Distributions

For CY2006, the accident analysis continued to reveal that **the dominance of accidents include Pilot Judgment & Actions Standard Problem Statements (SPS). This is similar to conclusions of previous years.** The absence of adequate preparation or planning by a pilot is often the initiating event in the accident sequence. **Improving pilot judgment and the ability to safely handle problems is the most effective way to improve helicopter safety.** The pilot is in the best position to change the outcome of a sequence of events; therefore, most interventions must affect pilot performance in a positive way. **A specific problem with pilot situational awareness is often connected in accidents to Pilot's Judgment & Action.**

The JHSAT found in its first year of analysis that a major factor contributing to helicopter accidents was the **failure to adequately manage known risks**. Due to the lack of a systematic process, including leadership and accountability, **operators did not adequately prioritize and mitigate the risks that led to accidents**. Analysis of the accidents revealed continuing operational safety issues that could be corrected by more effective and systematic management of risk and by better training.

Fatalities Based on Phase of Flight

